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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Michael R Parvin appeals from the district court's denial, following an evidentiary 
hearing, of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
This case returns on appeal from a remand ordered by the Court of Appeals in 
Parvin v. State, Docket No. 38295, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 453 (Idaho App., 
April 30, 2012).1 In that case, the Court offered the following factual background: 
Parvin pled guilty in 1999 to one count of lewd conduct with a child 
under the age of sixteen years. Following his guilty plea, Parvin received 
a unified sentence of life, with ten years determinate. Parvin then filed a 
timely motion under Rule 35, which the district court granted. Parvin's 
sentence was reduced to a twenty-year term, with five years determinate. 
The State filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the victims' rights 
were violated and that the court improperly applied the law in granting the 
Rule 35 motion. The district court vacated the order reducing Parvin's 
sentence on the basis that because the victims were not notified of the 
Rule 35 motion, the victims' constitutional and statutory rights had been 
violated. 
Parvin appealed the district court's decision to set aside its order 
reducing the sentence. Parvin argued that the district court's decision was 
erroneous because the court lacked the authority to vacate the original 
order and had no jurisdiction to consider a motion for reconsideration, and 
that reinstating the original sentence violated his due process rights under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The State countered that the 
district court lost its jurisdiction to decide the Rule 35 motion because it 
failed to act in a reasonable amount of time. This Court held that the 
record did not contain a sufficient reason as to why the district court took 
more than three months to decide the Rule 35 motion, and as such, "the 
jurisdiction of the district court had expired" prior to the issuance of the 
1 The district court took judicial notice of the appellate record in Docket No. 38295, and 
the Court of Appeals' opinion in that case is included at R, pp.113-20. 
1 
order reducing Parvin's sentence. State v. Parvin, 137 Idaho 783, 786, 53 
P.3d 834, 837 (Ct. App. 2002). 
In 2003, Parvin filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief 
alleging, in pertinent part, ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 
ensure that his Rule 35 motion was ruled upon in a reasonable period of 
time. Parvin requested assistance of counsel, which the district court 
granted and appointed the Canyon County Public Defender. A conflict 
was discovered and the case was transferred to a conflict public defender. 
After the subsequent appointment, the State filed a motion for summary 
dismissal. A notice of substitution of counsel was filed as another attorney 
took over the case. No other action was taken until a notice of intent to 
dismiss was filed pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(c). The 
district court filed an order of dismissal thereafter. 
Parvin later testified that he never received notice from either the 
district court or his appointed counsel of the proposed dismissal. Upon 
learning of the dismissal, Parvin filed a notice of appeal, which was then 
dismissed because it was untimely. 
Parvin filed another application for post-conviction relief, re-a"eging 
the grounds in the original application, and alleging several additional 
claims of ineffective assistance of his post-conviction counsel. Once 
again, Parvin argued that his original trial attorney was ineffective for 
failing to ensure that the district court ruled on his Rule 35 motion in a 
timely manner. He also asserted that he was entitled to a successive 
petition "because my claims were not knowingly or voluntarily waived. My 
claims were dismissed due to the ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counseL" 
The district court held that Parvin was entitled to a decision on the 
merits of his successive petition. After an evidentiary hearing, the district 
court denied and dismissed Parvin's amended application for post-
conviction relief. With respect to Parvin's claim that ineffective assistance 
of counsel resulted in the district court's loss of jurisdiction over his Rule 
35 motion, the district court held that the claim was one that was 
"addressed (even if not in the appellate decision) or should have been 
addressed on the direct appeal filed in the underlying criminal case." 
Parvin ... timely appealed. 
2 
Parvin, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 453 at 1-3. The Court of Appeals held that 
Parvin did not, and was not required to, raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
on direct appeal. kL at 7-8. It therefore vacated the dismissal of Parvin's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim and remanded the case to the district court "to render 
findings and conclusions on this claim." kL 
On remand, Parvin was again appointed counsel (R., p.9) and the district court 
once again held an evidentiary hearing (R., pp.22-23). Following that evidentiary 
hearing, finding that Parvin failed to meet his burden of proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence ineffective assistance of counsel, the district court denied Parvin's petition 
for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.121-135.) Parvin filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., 
pp.137-39.) 
3 
ISSUE 
Parvin states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Parvin's Rule 35 
claim? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court determined that Parvin failed 
to prove ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to his Rule 35 motion. Has Parvin 
failed to show error in the district court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief 
based on that determination? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
Parvin Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial, Following An 
Evidentiary Hearing, Of His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim 
A. Introduction 
On remand, after holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court held that 
Parvin failed to prove that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and so denied 
his petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.121-33.) On appeal, Parvin contends that 
he proved ineffective assistance of counsel and so should have been granted post-
conviction relief. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-11.) Parvin's argument fails on two 
independent bases: First, the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in 
the "critical stages" of a criminal prosecution does not extend to Rule 35 motions. 
Second, Parvin failed to prove that his attorney's performance was objectively deficient 
or that he was prejudiced by his attorney's handling of his Rule 35 motion. The district 
court therefore properly denied Parvin's petition for post-conviction relief. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because proceedings under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act are civil, where 
there is competent and substantial evidence to support a decision made after an 
evidentiary hearing on an application for post-conviction relief, that decision will not be 
disturbed on appeal. Odom v. State, 121 Idaho 625,826 P.2d 1337 (Ct. App. 1992). 
C. There Is No Sixth Amendment Right To The Effective Assistance Of Counsel In 
Relation To A Rule 35 Motion 
Throughout his petitions for post-conviction relief, Parvin has maintained that he 
was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel. (See,~, R., p.73.) But a 
5 
person convicted of a crime has no constitutional right to counsel in state post-
conviction proceedings. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-57 (1987); Murray v. 
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1963). The Sixth Amendment only guarantees a criminal 
defendant the right to counsel during all "critical stages" of the adversarial proceedings 
against him. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562, 149 P.3d 833, 837 (2006) (citing 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967); State v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638,637 
P.2d 415 (1981)). Although this right encompasses the first direct appeal, it does not 
extend to post-conviction proceedings. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 
(2007); Finley, 481 U.S. at 555. "The determination whether [a] hearing is a 'critical 
stage' requiring the provision of counsel depends ... upon an analysis 'whether potential 
substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the *** confrontation and the ability 
to help avoid that prejudice.'" Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (asterisks 
original, quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 227). 
Rule 35 challenges do not create a critical stage of the proceedings. United 
States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496-97 (11th Cir. 1991). This is because a Rule 35 
motion can "only benefit the defendant by reducing his sentence which had already 
become final." United States v. Taylor, 414 F.3d 528, 537 (4th Cir. 2005). There is, 
therefore, no Sixth Amendment right to counsel on a Rule 35 motion. Taylor, 414 F.3d 
at 537; United States v. Paloma, 80 F.3d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1996). Where a defendant 
has no constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, a defendant cannot be 
deprived of that right. Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982). 
While the Sixth Amendment right cannot apply in this case, Idaho Code § 19-852 
provides a statutory right to counsel, which the Court has recognized also "carrie[s] with 
6 
it the correlative right to effective assistance of counsel." Hall v. State, Docket No. 
38528/38704,2013 Opinion No. 128 at 5 (Idaho, December 2,2013). At no time below, 
however, did Parvin ever assert that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in 
relation to his Rule 35 motion was based on the deprivation of his statutory right to 
counsel. (See,~, R., pp.73, 81; see also Tr.) Parvin likewise failed to invoke a 
statutory right in his appellant's brief. (See generally Appellant's brief.) Under Idaho 
Code § 19-4903, petitioners for post-conviction relief are required to "specifically set 
forth the grounds upon which the application is based." Because Parvin failed to 
specifically set forth (or even generally set forth) the deprivation of a statutory right as 
the basis for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, no such claim should be 
considered on appeal. 
In addition, Parvin has failed to demonstrate that the statutory right to counsel 
justifies inquiry into trial counsel's actions in this case under Sixth Amendment 
standards. Previously, the Court has analyzed deprivations of the statutory right to 
counsel under a Sixth Amendment framework in cases which include a capital litigant 
challenging his death sentence, Hall, 2013 Opinion No. 128 at 4-5; a petition for review 
from a Court of Appeals decision in a criminal trial, Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 
687, 905 P.2d 86, 88 (1995); and a civil appeal from a board's designation of a 
defendant as a Violent Sexual Predator, Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 833-34, 203 
P.3d 1221, 1232-33 (2009). However, there is no reason to provide the same level of 
protection afforded a capital litigant in a capital case to a defendant seeking a routine 
reduction of sentence without the submission of any new evidence or argument. This is 
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especially true where the Sixth Amendment clearly does not require the same level of 
effective assistance of counsel in relation to such a motion for sentencing leniency. 
Parvin never asserted below that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in 
relation to his Rule 35 motion was based on anything other than a Sixth Amendment 
theory of the right to counsel. But Parvin's motion for a reduction of sentence was 
clearly a post-conviction motion. He was not, at that time, being confronted by the 
prosecutorial power of the State. The motion did not create a critical stage of the 
proceedings. Parvin therefore had no constitutional right to the effective assistance of 
counsel in relation to his Rule 35 motion. Thus, his claim that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel fails as a matter of law and the district court correctly denied 
Parvin's petition.2 
D. Parvin Failed To Prove By A Preponderance Of The Evidence That His Trial 
Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance In Relation To His Rule 35 Motion 
Even if Parvin's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel were legally 
cognizable, it would still fail on its merits. A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has 
the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which the 
claim is based. I.C.R. 57(c); McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 
(2010). At an evidentiary hearing, the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given 
their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters within 
the province of the trial court. Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 (Ct. 
2 While this is not the basis on which the district court denied Parvin's petition for post-
conviction relief, this Court may nevertheless affirm on this correct legal basis. See 
Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 579, 21 P.3d 895, 901 (2001) (Even U[w]here the lower 
court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory" this Court can apply "the 
correct theory" and affirm). 
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App. 1988). The district court's factual findings will not be disturbed if "supported by 
substantial, even if conflicting, evidence in the record." Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 
844,846,875 P.2d 941, 943 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312, 
658 P.2d 983 (1983)). On review of an order denying post-conviction relief, the lower 
court's decision that the burden of proof has not been met is entitled to great weight, 
and a finding that a party has failed to prove his claim will not be set aside unless that 
finding is clearly erroneous. Larkin, 115 Idaho at 74, 764 P.2d at 441. 
Parvin claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for railing to ensure that the 
district court ruled on his Rule 35 motion in a timely manner. (Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
Where the petitioner alleges entitlement to relief based upon ineffective assistance of 
counsel, he must show that his attorney's performance was objectively deficient and 
that he was prejudiced by that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-
88 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,760-61,760 P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1988). To 
establish deficient performance, the petitioner must overcome the strong presumption 
that counsel's performance was adequate and prove "that his attorney's conduct fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness." Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-
54, 177 P.3d 362,367-68 (2008) (citations omitted). U[S]trategic or tactical decisions will 
not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 
evaluation." kL. To establish prejudice, the petitioner must prove "that but for his 
attorney's deficient performance the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different." kL. Parvin failed to meet this burden of proof. 
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1. Parvin Failed To Prove Deficient Performance 
The district court found that Parvin failed to prove that his attorney rendered 
deficient performance. (R, pp.127-33.) That finding is supported by the record. The 
evidence adduced between the two evidentiary hearings shows that Parvin's trial 
attorney filed a Rule 35 motion 119 days after the entry of judgment, which is within the 
120-day time limit permitted under the rule. (Tr., p.9, L.23 - p.10, L.3; see also R, 
pp.28-32, 97.) In conjunction with filing that motion, trial counsel also requested a 30-
day enlargement of time, which the district court granted, to file additional evidence from 
Parvin in support of his Rule 35 motion. (R, pp.31-32, 34-35, 97.) No new evidence, 
however, was ever filed. (R, pp.39, 97.) Then, for reasons unknown, the district court 
delayed ruling on Parvin's motion for more than three months, by which time it had lost 
jurisdiction. See State v. Parvin, 137 Idaho 783, 786, 53 P.3d 834, 837 (Ct. App. 2002). 
On remand, Parvin argued that his attorney was deficient, asserting that he 
should have asked the district court to rule on the Rule 35 motion on day 120, after filing 
the motion on day 119, in order to preserve the district court's jurisdiction. (Tr., p.12, 
Ls.12-24.) But that is not what the standard requires. 
As explained by the Court of Appeals in Parvin's underlying criminal case, an 
attorney is required to file a Rule 35 motion within the time limits prescribed by Rule 35, 
and those time limits for the filing of the motion are strictly enforced. Parvin, 137 Idaho 
at 785, 53 P.3d at 836. However, "[a]lthough the 120-day filing period in Rule 35 is 
strictly enforced, the district court does not necessarily lose its jurisdiction by rendering 
its decision on a timely-filed motion after that period has expired." 19.,. (citing State v. 
Torres, 107 Idaho 895, 897-98, 693 P.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (Ct. App. 1984)). This 
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allows the district court a reasonable time in which to decide the timely-filed motion, 
ensuring that its deliberations are not "cut short or foreclosed altogether." kL at 786, 53 
P.3d at 837. Because the applicable legal standards do not require an attorney to get a 
ruling on a timely-filed Rule 35 motion within the 120-day limitation period, Parvin's 
single claim of deficient performance for which he presented evidence at the evidentiary 
hearing on remand fails. 
In fact, under the standards governing Rule 35, as long as the court's ruling is not 
"unreasonably delayed" and the court "establish[es] a record substantiating the reasons 
for its delay," the district court will maintain jurisdiction to rule on the motion. See kL 
(citing State v. Maggard, 126 Idaho 477,886 P.2d 782 (Ct. App. 1994)). As explained 
by the Court of Appeals, it was the absence of such a record in this case which resulted 
in the district court's loss of jurisdiction: 
The record in the instant case likewise does not evidence the 
reasons for the district court's delay of more than three months in reaching 
its decision on Parvin's Rule 35 motion. It identifies no reasons for 
requiring an extended deliberative period; no requests to hold the decision 
in abeyance by the parties; and no indication of court scheduling 
difficulties. The court did not require additional time to examine the 
supplemental materials that Parvin requested to file, but did not. Finally, 
the district court's order indicates that it considered very little new material 
regarding Parvin's Rule 35 motion. 
kL The district court lost jurisdiction to rule on Parvin's Rule 35 motion because it 
delayed ruling on the motion for more than three months and there was no adequate 
record for its delay, not because trial counsel insufficiently nagged the court the day 
after he filed the Rule 35 motion. Because Parvin failed to prove that his counsel was 
objectively deficient in regards to his Rule 35 motion, his claim was correctly denied. 
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While not the basis articulated by the Court of Appeals in Parvin's underlying 
case for the district court's loss of jurisdiction, appellate courts have also ruled that it is 
"defense counsel's responsibility to precipitate action on [a Rule 35 motion] within a 
reasonable time frame." State v. Day, 131 Idaho 181, 186, 953 P.2d 624, 626 (Ct. App. 
1998). Parvin interprets Day to mean that the mere fact that a district court lost 
jurisdiction by delaying its ruling on a timely-filed Rule 35 motion proves that counsel 
rendered deficient performance. Parvin asserts that the attorney has a duty to "file a 
request-in the form of a motion or other filing-with the district court seeking a ruling 
on the motion before the district court loses jurisdiction." (Appellant's brief, p.10.) 
Contrary to Parvin's assertions, this case illustrates why there is no such per se 
deficient performance rule, as under the specific facts of this case this Court must 
presume that it was a tactical decision for trial counsel not to file such a motion. 
The record below shows that in conjunction with the Rule 35 motion, defense 
counsel also requested an enlargement of time to supply the court with new and 
additional information from Parvin in support of that motion. (R., pp.31-32.) Trial 
counsel clearly intended to submit this new and additional information, which he 
anticipated receiving from his client, in support of the Rule 35 motion. (ld.) That 
evidence, however, was never presented to the district court. (R., p.39.) Parvin argues 
that trial counsel, after requesting and being granted additional time to collect and 
submit additional information, was required to move the district court to rule on his Rule 
35 motion before he submitted that additional information. Parvin thus argues that trial 
counsel was required to abandon the basis for his enlargement of time, which the 
district court had already granted, in order to render adequate performance. Contrary to 
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these bare and conclusory allegations, making the tactical decision to wait until the 
additional information had been filed before requesting a ruling on the timely-filed Rule 
35 motion does not prove that trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient. 
Moreover, there is no indication from the evidence produced at the evidentiary 
hearing or contained in the record that the failure to present the additional information in 
a timely manner rested with trial counsel. During the evidentiary hearing, Parvin 
acknowledged that his trial counsel requested additional information from him. (Tr., 
p.10, Ls.4-14.) He also testified that he gathered that information and forwarded it to his 
attorney. (Tr., p.10, Ls.15-20.) Parvin never testified, however, when he provided the 
additional information to his attorney. (See generally Tr.) 
Because Parvin never testified when he sent the information to his attorney, and 
Parvin's trial counsel did not testify, Parving failed to prove that trial counsel had the 
information and could have presented it to the district court before that court lost 
jurisdiction. Presuming that trial counsel's performance was adequate, as required by 
the applicable legal standard, and drawing every inference in favor of the court's ruling 
on remand, it is reasonable to infer that Parvin failed to timely forward the additional 
materials to trial counsel, which prevented trial counsel from submitting those materials 
to the district court in a more timely fashion. 
To establish deficient performance, Parvin was required to overcome the strong 
presumption that his attorney's performance was adequate. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153-
54, 177 P.3d at 367-68. To overcome that presumption, he was required to show that 
any "strategic or tactical decisions" were "based on inadequate preparation, ignorance 
of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." kL Clearly the 
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choice of whether to move the court to rule on the motion before the evidence was 
submitted, or to wait until after the evidence was submitted, was a tactical choice, 
presumed to be competent unless proven to be the result of ignorance of the law, 
inadequate preparation, or some other objective shortcoming. Because Parvin failed to 
prove such an objective shortcoming, he failed to prove that his attorney's performance 
in relation to the Rule 35 motion was objectively deficient and the district court correctly 
denied his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
2. Parvin Failed To Prove Prejudice 
Parvin also failed to prove that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's handling 
of his Rule 35 motion. Parvin asserts prejudice as a foregone conclusion, claiming "we 
know that the district court would have granted the Rule 35 motion because it did so, 
albeit only after losing jurisdiction." (Appellant's brief, p.?) This assertion omits 
significant facts from the record. The district court initially granted Parvin's motion but, 
after holding a contested hearing, reversed its decision to grant Rule 35 relief-
something Parvin acknowledged at the evidentiary hearing. (Tr., p.13, L.25 - p.15, L.S.) 
Therefore, contrary to Parvin's assertions, the facts in this case are that after holding a 
contested hearing, the district court ultimately did not grant Parvin Rule 35 relief. 
In fact, under the peculiar facts of this case, the district court could not grant 
Parvin Rule 35 relief absent a contested hearing. As related by the Court of Appeals in 
Parvin's initial appeal: 
In December 1999, Parvin pled guilty to one count of lewd and 
lascivious conduct with a child under the age of sixteen years, Idaho Code 
Section 1S-150S. In exchange for that guilty plea, the state agreed not to 
seek additional charges related to other recent molestations admitted by 
Parvin. The state also conditioned its acceptance of the plea bargain 
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upon Parvin's agreement that all of Parvin's victims, including their 
immediate family members, would be present and permitted to testify at 
sentencing. 
Parvin, 137 Idaho at 784, 53 P.3d at 835. To resentence Parvin without granting the 
victims and their families their right to be present and to testify would be a breach of 
Parvin's plea agreement. Parvin's plea agreement required the district court to hold a 
contested hearing before it could reduce his sentence, and upon holding that contested 
hearing the district court did not grant Parvin's motion. 
Had defense counsel precipitated action on Parvin's Rule 35 motion by setting 
the required contested hearing, there is no reason to believe that the outcome would 
have been different than the actual outcome of the contested hearing actually held. 
Certainly the evidence does not clearly establish that "the district court would have 
granted the Rule 35 motion." Rather, from all of the evidence contained in the record it 
appears as likely, if not more so, that after holding the required contested hearing the 
district court would have denied Parvin's motion. Parvin therefore failed to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he suffered prejudice as a result of his attorney's 
performance, and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was correctly denied. 
Parvin had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to his Rule 35 motion. He failed to 
meet that burden. Having failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Parvin's 
petition was correctly denied. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying and dismissing Parvin's petition for post-conviction relief. 
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